In accordance with the provisions of our Political Constitution, individuals can exercise public functions according to the regime determined by Law; when in this public function their actions cause damages due to their malicious or seriously culpable behavior, these must be repaired by the State. This entails the possibility of responding within the framework of the recourse for restitution, under the terms of Article 90 of the Charter. Nonetheless, recent jurisprudence of the Third Section of the Council of State has declared individuals (contractors) who were sued by the State in its exercise of the recourse as civilly responsible, without it having been proven that they were vested in a public function; the fact that they were linked to the formalization, execution, or liquidation of a State Contract was sufficient proof. The concern generated by such a position, in terms of the legal insecurity it represents for the State contractor, led the author to write these lines. What are the means of contractual control then? Where is the value of a settlement that declared a contractor “held safe and harmless” from indemnity? Is the character of “collaborator in management” of the state contractor a sufficient argument for this extension of responsibility? It’s worrisome that this jurisprudential trend could lead to a significant alteration inthe eq uality of treatment towards the State contractor, to an ad infinitum distortion of transaction costs and, in the short term, to a deterioration in the quality and quantity of those who might look to compete for the execution of a contract forwork financed with public resources. In short, it would mean an involution in the objectives of efficiency and transparency that the public contractual regulation seeks, which would see its field of action dramatically interfered by the irruption of extra contractual civil liabilities.