The UN Charter outlines a series of rules which endow the Security Council with the duty of veiling for international peace and security. However, some of these provisions are rather ambiguous, and in most occasions, are interpreted by the Council’s Member States. One of the main traits of this organ is its veto power dynamic, which is solely granted to Permanent Member States, and is thus applicable to voting processes, without following any set of well-defined criteria, be it under the Charter’s provisions or by dint of any other instrument. This calls for a questioning of the extent to which the application of veto power is mediated by motivations that go beyond the UN itself. In this sense, this paper seeks to identify the different underlying motivations which might have led to an active use of veto power within the Council’s decision-making processes. For this end, case-studies pertaining the Middle East (2001-2018) are analyzed. In order to accomplish the latter, five criteria are established to assess these motivations, considering a sample of both, approved resolutions and vetoed drafts. This review suggests that the criterion of politico-diplomatic interdependence is the most significant one within the set of contemplated cases, notwithstanding the fact that said motivations tend to vary and are rather circumstantial. Thus, the existence of patterns in voting and veto processes is demystified.