espanolSe amplia el modelo colectivo de comportamiento de un hogar para considerar tanto el consumo publico como la no participacion laboral. La identificacion de las preferencias individuales y la regla de reparto, mediante la observacion de la oferta laboral individual y el gasto total en el bien publico, se basan en la existencia de un factor de distribucion y salarios unicos de reserva para cada adulto, ambos indiferentes entre participar o no. Con una muestra de familias nucleares mexicanas la racionalidad colectiva no es rechazada. No se encontro evidencia que empoderar a las madres sea la opcion mas beneficiosa para los ninos. EnglishWe extend the collective model of household behavior to consider both public consumption (expenditures on children), as well as non-participation in the labor market. Identification of individual preferences and the sharing rule derived by observing each individual’s labor supply and the total expenditure on the public good rest on the existence of a distribution factor and on the existence and uniqueness of individual reservation wages at which both members are indifferent as to whether a member participates or not. Using a sample of Mexican nuclear families, collective rationality is not rejected. No evidence is found that empowering mothers is more beneficial for children than empowering fathers.