Biology, body and self-consciousness: some reflections from phenomenology and neuropsychology of action. The purpose of this paper is to understand cognition from the standpoint of biological autonomy, and how this phenomena is affirmed constantly through the interactions the organisms, endogenously and due to their own organization, establish with a meaningful world. The methodic study concerning the sense of self allow us to conclude that is in the active immersion of biological systems through their agency, within a significant environment, where several interactive situations emerge and affirm their identities by way of self-specifying processes. We propose to conceptually revisit the studies of self to acknowledge the active role that organisms play in the constitution of their experience and in the temporal structure of such experience. Moreover, such theory has to be built from a deep reflection on the biological basis of agency, the function of the brain as a mediator of homeostatic regulation and action, and the acceptance of the first person's perspective as ineludible to study consciousness. Finally, we reflect on the phenomenological aspects of schizophrenia and how within this pathology prevails the absence of a meaningful direction to the world and of a genuine sense of self through intentionality. Intentionality, indeed, is understood as that feature that gives direction to lived experience. Key words. Biology and intentionality, self-consciousness, neurodynamics, neuropsychology of action, agency, Phenomenology.