El presente articulo de reflexion analizara el discurso justificante de la detencion preventiva que sostuvo la Corte Suprema de Justicia en vigencia del sistema procesal penal anterior –de tendencia inquisitiva– que estaba apuntalado sobre la creencia de ser la presuncion de inocencia un derecho no absoluto y, por tanto, susceptible de una cierta degradacion que se produciria gradualmente a medida que obraran pruebas en el proceso que comprometieran la responsabilidad penal del procesado. Este discurso, como se vera en este articulo, ignoro el hecho de ser la presuncion de inocencia una garantia que acompana al inculpado durante todo el proceso y que solo puede ser desvirtuada, definitiva mas no progresivamente, en una sentencia judicial de condena. Se mostrara tambien como dicha postura, al creer suficiente requisito para la imposicion de la detencion preventiva la concurrencia de la referida degradacion, ignoro la necesidad de sujetar la imposicion de dicha medida al cumplimiento de unos fines estrictamente procesales que la ley ha senalado, confundiendo asi el instituto con una especie de pena anticipada. Abstract The present article of reflection was analyzing the justifying speech of the preventive detention that supported the Supreme Court of Justice in force of the previous procedural penal system -of inquisitive trend- that was supported on the belief of being the presumption of innocence a not absolute right and, therefore, capable of a certain degradation that would take place gradually as they were working tests in the process that they were compromising the penal responsibility of the accused. This speech, since one will see in this article, ignored the fact of being the presumption of innocence a guarantee that he accompanies to accused during the whole process and that alone can be spoilt, definitive more not progressively, in a judicial judgment of sentence. Me will show also how the above mentioned position, when sufficient requirement believes for the imposition of the preventive detention the concurrence of the above-mentioned degradation, ignored the need to hold the imposition of the above mentioned measure to the fulfillment of a few strictly procedural ends that the law has indicated, confusing this way the institute with a species of an early sorrow.