Este articulo analiza el caracter politico de la tributacion, lo que ayuda a explicar por que no ha sido homogenea la adopcion del modelo auspiciado por el FMI en America Latina. Toma a Colombia como caso de estudio para mostrar que las reformas tributarias estan supeditadas a su discusion en el Congreso, lo que genera diferencias entre las propuestas del ejecutivo y las leyes aprobadas. Ademas, muestra que la intervencion de grupos de intereses particulares en el diseno y la aplicacion de la politica tributaria ayuda a explicar esas diferencias.This paper analyzes the political nature of taxation, which helps to explain why adoption from the model sponsored by the IMF in Latin America, especially after the debt crisis, has not been homogeneous. Colombia is taken as a case study to show how tax reforms depend on the political process in Congress, which opens a gap between the bills, inspired by IMF, and the final laws. Finally, it raises some arguments that suggest the special interests’ role in the design and application of tax policy, which interact without being necessarily reconcilable and can also explain the divergence between bills and laws.