This paper conducts a comparative analysis of the fundamental concepts of self-consciousness of J. G. Fichte and G. H Mead. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that the two concepts converge in shaping an idea of the self-conscious subject in which the inter-subjective interaction is at the base of the condition of possibility of the I (Fichte) or self (Mead). This demonstration requires that the models of inter-subjectivity underlying the respective notions of self-awareness, represented, in the case of Fichte, in the theory of exhortation and, in Mead, on the theory of role-taking be made explicit. This analysis seeks to illustrate that both notions describe a practical idea of inter-subjectivity under the rules of meaning present both models, i.e., by the attitudes and behaviors that are required of subjects for any successful inter-subjective relationship. This semantic rule allows one to arrive at the ultimate meaning that both ideas of self-awareness encompass: that it is, for both thinkers, a phenomenon possible only by the social mediation that precedes it and in which it is originally immersed.