The aim of this work is to critique a conventionalist interpretation of the problem of rule-following set out in Saul Kripke s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. To achieve this we propose a detailed reading of paragraphs §§185-217 of the Philosophical Investigations showing that there are cases in which the meaning of expressions such as ?obeying a rule and ?going against it isn't determined only by appeal to a conventional criterion like Kripke claims. Also, we discuss the arguments of a Kripkean interpretation and evaluate its virtues and weaknesses. This interpretation allow us to state that while Wittgenstein accepts the importance of customs and institutions for the correct development of normative judgments, he also claims that there is a trans-conventional reference system the space of the human which allows us to recognize normative attitudes other than those we are used to, thus aiding us in producing meaningful normative judgments. This reference system is known as the ?common behaviour of mankind (PI §206). So, following our reading of §206, we can identify in the remarks on rule-following the basis for a shift away from a conventionalist interpretation towards an anthropological one.