The subject of this thesis work is the nature of philosophy in the thought of the second Wittgenstein. The thesis that I defend is that the nature of philosophy is intimately related with the author?s language conception, and in that relies its complexity. It is in relationship to the conception of meaning that is possible to show the two senses in which Wittgenstein talks about philosophy, senses that are expressed in a dogmatic and non systematic way throughout his later works. On one hand, Wittgenstein talks about a manner of doing philosophy that is inclined to work with meaningless signs, and therefore, is an futile activity, i.e. what is known as the negative or destructive sense of philosophy (Cfr. Hacker 2005: 191). On the other hand, he talks about a way of doing philosophy capable of working with meaningful language. The task of this philosophy is then to dissolve the misunderstandings within philosophy itself, and to prevent other misunderstandings from arising do to the incorrect use of language, i.e. the positive or therapeutic sense of philosophy (Cfr. Hallet 1977: 192).