This study examines the role of a host country’s formal institutional environments on the design of international joint venture (IJV) contract and enhances our understanding on what types of IJV contract provisions/clauses should be more intensely utilized to respond to the challenges of the formal institutional environment of the host country. Using fine-grained data on 404 international joint venture contracts signed in between 2000 and 2016, we identified all contact provisions/clauses used in IJVs and classified them into three groups of clauses, namely (1) management structure, (2) control, and (3) operation through factor analysis. We then linked the three groups to the multiple dimensions of formal institutional environment (i.e., legal origin, court efficiency, and corruption). Empirical results reveal that when firms establish an IJV in a host country where the legal uncertainty is high due to the lack of legal formality (e.g., common law countries), control clauses that specify legal remedies and safeguards are more intensely utilized. On the other hand, when IJVs are established in non-common law countries, the utilization intensity of management structure clauses stipulating internal governance mechanisms such as board/informal meetings are increased. Similarly, internal governance mechanisms are more intensely used when the contract enforcement in the court of a host country takes a longer time. Finally, a high level of corruption in a host country increases the utilization intensity of control clauses rather than management structure and operation clauses. These findings extend the alliance governance literature and advance research on institutional theory.