Scholarship on state-owned multinationals assumes ownership is known and unchanging. Overlooked in the literature is a critical difference between SOEs and private firms – in SOEs not only may ownership itself change suddenly and unexpectedly as a result of changes in government, but so might the owner’s objectives. We explore the consequences of this insight by examining the effects of elections on a key managerial strategy – disclosure. Theory suggests that SOEs are subject to political as well as economic pressures, and that managerial motives to reveal or conceal information may shift over electoral cycles. The paper develops hypotheses around the moderating effect of elections and institutions on disclosure in state sponsored FDI, and tests them on a sample of 965 investments in 81 countries in the global upstream petroleum industry, known for its political salience, FDI, SOEs, and opacity. We find that only during election periods do SOEs shift their strategy in favor of full disclosure.