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Designing the Game to Play: Optimizing Payoff Structure in Security Games

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Abstract:

We study Stackelberg Security Games where the defender, in addition to allocating defensive resources to protect targets from the attacker, can strategically manipulate the attacker’s payoff under budget constraints in weighted L^p-norm form regarding the amount of change. For the case of weighted L^1-norm constraint, we present (i) a mixed integer linear program-based algorithm with approximation guarantee; (ii) a branch-and-bound based algorithm with improved efficiency achieved by effective pruning; (iii) a polynomial time approximation scheme for a special but practical class of problems. In addition, we show that problems under budget constraints in L^0 and weighted L^\infty-norm form can be solved in polynomial time.

Tópico:

Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis

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Citations: 3
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Páginas512 - 518
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