We examine the payoff performance, up to the end of 2013, of non-agency residential mortgagebacked securities (RMBS), issued up to 2008.We have created a new and detailed data set on the universe of non-agency residential mortgage backed securities, per carefully assembling source data from Bloomberg and other sources.We compare these payoffs to their ex-ante ratings as well as other characteristics.We establish seven facts.First, the bulk of these securities was rated AAA.Second, AAA securities did ok: on average, their total cumulated losses up to 2013 are 2.3 percent.Third, the subprime AAA-rated segment did particularly well.Fourth, later vintages did worse than earlier vintages, except for subprime AAA securities.Fifth, the bulk of the losses were concentrated on a small share of all securities.Sixth, the misrating for AAA securities was modest.Seventh, controlling for a home price bust, a home price boom was good for the repayment on these securities.Together, these facts provide challenge the conventional narrative, that improper ratings of RMBS were a major factor in the financial crisis of 2008.