The colombian civil war should not have any structural justification at least in agrarian problems solutions. The article demonstrates it analyzing the Number One point of the preliminary agreement between the Colombian government and the insurgent faction FARC, named "Política de desarrollo agrario integral". The basic hypothesis exposes the risk of this agreement in maintain the actual smallholding agrarian exploitations and so the structural contradictions to maintain rural poverty which conduced to political violence. First it compares the text of the pre agreement with legal agrarian reforms Laws 200 of 1936 and 135 of 1961 defining their levels of concordance. Second, it demonstrates the lack of any cualitative or cuantitative differences between this preliminary agreement and the principal legal and conceptual agrarian reforms which has been applied (and failed) in Colombia from the begining of the 20 century. So, it generates some conclusions and recomendations suggesting that this paradox should demonstrate that colombian civil war between Stablishment and Insurgence did not have any structural opposition about this essential agrarian policies because both of them agrees in repeating all the historical failed agrarian strategies actions which conduced to the civil war as well as this is presented as the way to negotiate the war`s ending.