In “Rational Animals” (1982) and “Thought and Talk (1975) Davidson argues that there cannot be thought without language: a language-less creature is, therefore, a thoughtless creature. Davidson advances two arguments in order to prove this point, both of which appear to be unconvincing. In this paper we shall review both arguments and raise the possibility to establish a connection between them, in order to attempt to make them stronger. First, we will explain the role these arguments play inside Davidson’s radical interpretation theory, showing why it is important for Davidson which concludes that there’s not language without thought. We will then review Davidson’s arguments and show why they are problematic. After this, we suggest a strategy to make the arguments stronger. Finally, we will explain how all these strategies do not work because even if it is possible to prove that being a language user is a sufficient condition for having thoughts, the arguments cannot conclude that this is a necessary condition for the possession of thoughts.