Some authors (Blainey (1973)) argue that in an economy in conflict the lack of certainty about external events, or the ignorance of the characteristics of the agents involved, reduces the level of dissipated resources, while other authors (Wittman (1979)) argue exactly the opposite. A basic neoclassical model of conflict, where the agents have uncertainty about the true value assigned by the opponents to a disputed good, is used to asses the role of uncertainty in the conflict, and to evaluate if a higher degree of uncertainty generates higher or lower levels of conflict. The role of uncertainty in the conflict varies according to who has the uncertainty, what is the uncertainty about and according to the direction that the perceptions are following. It is shown that the resources that the agents devote to the conflict are monotonically increasing with the perceptions about the true valoration of the good in dispute and the information about what is the best for the opponents. Finally, a significative increase in the intensity of the conflict is possible if the perceptions evolve in such a way that all the groups in the conflict believe they have an advantage over the other groups.