The corporate liability action in Colombia is the mechanism for the protection and rebuilding the social equity when it is impaired by the actions or omissions of the administrators.However, this mechanism is not sufficiently appropriate due to its approval system that requires the consent of 50% + 1 from the highest corporate body.In cases where there is a majority shareholder with influence over the administrator, it will be virtually impossible to approve such action.For these situations it is proposed an approach, whereby the administrator can be considered not necessarily as a law breaker, but a market player subject to a prisoner's dilemma.Through this work, an economic analysis of the law will be carried out to grant provisional and permanent mechanisms for which the company can directly protect its equity, such as the reduction of information asymmetry, the limitation of private control benefits, the creation of legal incentives, good practices from corporate governance, the creation of model legal disincentives to implement sufficient protection measures for social equity in Colombia, or alternatives such as the implementation of the derivative action, complementary to the corporate liability action.