In Truth and Method as well as in other writings, Gadamer frecuently points to the strong historical bond between Rhetoric and Hermeneutics. However, his remarks on the issue are usually tangential making it difficult to clearly determine which points of contact he wishes to highlight between the two disciplines. In this article, I examine three such points. First, I refer to the sort of knowledge that both traditions pursue, and for which the common labels of “art”, “technique” or “method” are insufficient. Second, I refer to the type of truth sought by each. Said truth is a “practical truth”, closer to “plausible” or “verisimilar” assertions than to exact or demonstrable ones. Finally, I analyze the kind of interpretive process they seek. My main thesis is that for Gadamer the kind of comprehension that takes place in the Human Sciences has a persuasive or rhetorical moment, in which the interpreter is affected by the textual tradition she faces.