Our main interest in nonconceptual mental content is to state a substantive version (non trivial) of this kind of content in perceptual experience. The debate about nonconceptual content has focused mostly around its very existence, and the argu-ments for endorse a non-substantive version according to which nonconceptual content is the one which does not satisfy some conceptual requirements. Thus, for building a substantive version of nonconceptual mental content we have appealed to the version of perceptual experience of spatial properties offered by Evans (1982 ch. 6). Taking this as a starting point we develop a new argument for nonconcep-tual content in perceptual experience that links it whit the characteristic activity of perceptual experience. Finally, we expose one of the attacks to the notion of noncon-ceptual mental content (McDowell 1996) and we present our replies to this attack, showing it is insufficient. In showing that McDowell’s criticism is not successful, we believe we could have a version of the nonconceptual mental content of perceptual experience which is immune to his line of argumentation.